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Levels and drivers of fishers’ compliance with marine protected areas
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ABSTRACT. Effective conservation depends largely on people’s compliance with regulations. We investigate compliance through the
lens of fishers’ compliance with marine protected areas (MPAs). MPAs are widely used tools for marine conservation and fisheries
management. Studies show that compliance alone is a strong predictor of fish biomass within MPAs. Hence, fishers’ compliance is
critical for MPA effectiveness. However, there are few empirical studies showing what factors influence fishers’ compliance with MPAs.
Without such information, conservation planners and managers have limited opportunities to provide effective interventions. By
studying 12 MPAs in a developing country (Costa Rica), we demonstrate the role that different variables have on fishers’ compliance
with MPAs. Particularly, we found that compliance levels perceived by resource users were higher in MPAs (1) with multiple livelihoods,
(2) where government efforts against illegal fishing were effective, (3) where fishing was allowed but regulated, (4) where people were
more involved in decisions, and (5) that were smaller. We also provide a novel and practical measure of compliance: a compound
variable formed by the number illegal fishers and their illegal fishing effort. Our study underlines the centrality of people’s behavior in
nature conservation and the importance of grounding decision making on the social and institutional realities of each location.
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INTRODUCTION
Nature conservation is fundamentally about managing people.
Consequently, the effectiveness of conservation interventions
depends on people’s compliance with regulations. However,
noncompliance with environmental regulations is pervasive, as
illustrated by the following examples. In the worldwide timber
trade, roughly 20% to 50% of all timber is of illegal origin
(INTERPOL and The World Bank 2010). Meanwhile, in the
world’s industrial fisheries, estimates of nearly 20% of reported
catch being illegal are probably conservative (Agnew et al. 2009).
At least 23,000 elephants were poached in 2013, with wide-
ranging consequences including the decimation of elephant
populations, large-scale corruption, and funding of militias (Vira
and Ewing 2014). Poaching has ultimately militarized the struggle
between poachers and rangers with deadly consequences: more
than half  of the world’s ranger deaths can be attributed to
poachers (IUCN 2014). Noncompliance with environmental
regulations threatens not only the environment, but also social
and economic prosperity.  
Compliance with fisheries regulations has been recognized as a
vital topic to be addressed to achieve marine conservation goals.
Therefore, in this study, we consider compliance though the lens
of illegal fishing in marine protected areas (MPAs), which are
increasingly used for conservation and fisheries management.
International commitments to marine conservation aim to
effectively conserve 10% of the world’s coastal and marine areas
(CBD 2010), although Devillers et al. (2015) and others have
criticized broadly based percentage targets. Regardless of extent
and location, however, the effectiveness of MPAs relies largely on
users’ compliance, particularly that of fishers, because fishing can
profoundly degrade global marine ecosystems and biodiversity
(Pauly et al. 2002). The mere presence of an MPA does not
guarantee fishers’ compliance, and its effectiveness can be eroded
by illegal fishing. Indeed, ecological performance of MPAs has
been clearly linked to compliance (Pollnac et al. 2010, Bergseth
et al. 2013).  
Despite the crucial importance of compliance for effective MPA
management, little empirical research has attempted to investigate
compliance with MPAs. Studies in other contexts have examined
compliance, for example in hunting (Muth and Bowe 1998,
Lindsey et al. 2013) and fisheries (Raakjær et al. 2003, King and
Sutinen 2010, Sundström 2012). Although these studies provide
useful information that could be applied to MPAs, their
transferability is limited because of the different contexts. Further,
although some studies have focused on measuring or
understanding fishers’ compliance in MPAs (Wood 2004,
Peterson and Stead 2011, Read et al. 2011, Arias and Sutton 2013,
Arias et al. 2014), the current literature and evidence base on
compliance levels and, importantly, the factors that influence
fishers’ compliance with MPAs remain limited (Peterson and
Stead 2011, Bergseth et al. 2013). The theoretical concepts
underpinning compliance have been recently reviewed in the
broader context of nature conservation (Arias 2015), but
compliance with MPAs is linked to complex social and
institutional interactions (e.g., rules, socio-demographics, and
enforcement) that are context dependent.  
Illegal fishing, either inside or outside MPAs, is a very broad topic,
encompassing, for example, gear types, target species, regulations,
and socioeconomic characteristics of regions where illegal fishing
takes place (Arias 2015). This heterogeneity implies that we
should not expect to find simple, generalizable solutions to
noncompliance. Successful management interventions are
typically characterized by responses that are adequate for the local
socioeconomic and institutional realities (Waylen et al. 2010). It
can be expected, therefore, that global progress in minimizing
illegal fishing can be achieved through the multiplication of well-
designed and locally relevant interventions that consider
contextual factors (Petrossian 2015). Compliance management
should be informed by a thorough understanding of factors that
influence compliance in specific settings. Managers can then
foster positive factors (e.g., high perceived legitimacy for
institutions) and mitigate negative ones (e.g., weak social barriers
against undesired behaviors).  
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Table 1. Marine protected areas (MPAs) included in the study and key characteristics. Caletas-Arío and Camaronal were considered
as one MPA, as explained in the Methods.
 
Managing institution Coast Name Fishing permitted Year created Area (km2) Clear geographic
boundaries ‡
SINAC Caribbean Cahuita Yes † 1970 233.0 No
SINAC Pacific Santa Rosa No 1971 464.0 No
SINAC Pacific Manuel Antonio No 1972 420.2 No
SINAC Pacific Cabo Blanco No 1982 16.3 No
SINAC Pacific Ostional Yes 1983 80.6 No
SINAC Caribbean Gandoca-Manzanillo Yes 1985 49.8 No
SINAC Pacific Marino Ballena No 1990 52.3 No
SINAC Pacific Caletas-Arío Yes 2006 198.5 No
SINAC Pacific Camaronal Yes 2009 160.3 No
INCOPESCA Pacific Palito-Montero Yes 2009 6.3 Yes
INCOPESCA Pacific Golfo Dulce Yes 2010 750.0 No
INCOPESCA Pacific Isla Caballo Yes 2012 1.3 No
† Legally, fishing is not allowed in Cahuita (Asamblea Legislativa 2005); however, SINAC allows local fishermen to fish in certain areas within the
Park, although gillnets are not allowed.
‡ Boundaries that are easy to locate accurately, and are undisputed by the community.
INCOPESCA indicates Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y Acuicultura; SINAC, Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación. 
Here, we use MPAs in Costa Rica as a case study to analyze factors
influencing fishers’ compliance. MPAs in Costa Rica are affected
by illegal fishing (Salas et al. 2012), which we define here either
as fishing done in MPAs where fishing is not permitted, or
breaking fishing regulations where fishing is permitted, e.g., using
gillnets where they are not allowed (Table 1). Apart from Cocos
Island National Park (Arias et al. 2014), there are no scientific
studies focusing on illegal fishing in Costa Rican MPAs. We
investigated illegal fishing within 12 MPAs in Costa Rica (Table
1) to answer two research questions. First, what are the levels of
fishers’ compliance in each MPA? Second, what is influencing
fishers’ compliance levels? These two questions are key for
understanding and managing compliance (Arias 2015). Our
broad goal is to help direct and tailor management efforts that
increase conservation effectiveness. The methods used here could
also be applied to other areas, where our results could help
contextualize compliance.
MPAs in Costa Rica
Costa Rica has 31 MPAs, only 2 of which are offshore. Three
MPAs are in the Caribbean and the rest are in the Pacific. All
MPAs are managed by the state. The Ministry of Environment
manages 23 MPAs through the National System of Conservation
Areas (Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación, or SINAC),
and the fisheries authority (Instituto Costarricense de Pesca y
Acuicultura, or INCOPESCA) manages the remaining 8 MPAs.
MPAs managed by SINAC are patrolled by the Coast Guard and
SINAC, and MPAs managed by INCOPESCA are patrolled by
the Coast Guard. INCOPESCA has no patrolling mandates but
can sanction noncompliance administratively. However,
INCOPESCA’s fisheries management, including sanctioning
processes, is weak. For example, audits done by the Comptroller
General found that INCOPESCA has not implemented bag and
size limits, temporary and spatial closures are not science based,
and the fishery database is outdated (CGR 2012, 2014).
INCOPESCA’s mismanagement has contributed to the
impoverished state of fisheries and fishing communities in Costa
Rica, sparking multiple calls for intervention and restructuring
(Frente por Nuestros Mares 2013, Comisión Presidencial para la
Gobernanza Marina 2012).  
SINAC’s approach has historically been top-down and includes
no-take management categories, leading to MPAs that can
disenfranchise fishers (Solis et al. 2012). Since the mid-1990s,
SINAC opted to establish MPAs that would allow fishing and
created new, more permissive management categories in 2008
(Salas et al. 2012). Similarly, in 2008, INCOPESCA created a type
of MPA called a “responsible fishing area.” Responsible fishing
areas aim for fisheries sustainability and involve a bottom-up
approach by which fishing communities propose an area and a
management plan to INCOPESCA. Compared with traditional
top-down approaches, responsible fishing areas have been
generally well received by several artisanal fishing communities
(Fargier et al. 2014). Recent marine conservation efforts in Costa
Rica, both from SINAC and INCOPESCA, aim to involve
stakeholders in decision making. However, still lacking is a strong
governance system that allows balanced participation and
adequate conservation (Comisión Presidencial para la
Gobernanza Marina 2012, Solis et al. 2012, Jimenez-Ramón
2015). The country lacks clear policies that integrate sustainable
use, conservation, navigation and ports, and safety at sea
(Comisión Presidencial para la Gobernanza Marina 2012). The
weak legal and governance system can foster noncompliance, for
instance through inadequate legislation and enforcement (Arias
et al. 2014), or low perceived legitimacy of management
institutions (Levi et al. 2012).
METHODS
Study sites
We studied 12 coastal MPAs in Costa Rica, which at the time of
sampling represented 46% of Costa Rica’s coastal MPAs, each
with different characteristics (Table 1 and Appendix 1). MPAs
were chosen purposely to provide a varied sample in terms of size,
year created, location, and whether fishing was allowed or not.
These characteristics have been described in the literature as
factors likely influencing compliance with MPAs (Andrade and
Rhodes 2012).  
Although Table 1 lists 12 MPAs, the Caletas-Arío and Camaronal
MPAs were merged in the analyses because of (1) geographic
proximity (Appendix 1); (2) lack of clear boundaries (Table 1);
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(3) same regulations and similar size and age (Table 1); and (4)
two artisanal fishing communities being located between them,
with interviews revealing that fishers from the two communities
fished both areas. For analysis purposes we averaged the age and
size of these two MPAs.
Questionnaires and key informant interviews
Data collection was through questionnaires and key informant
interviews, from February to April 2014. The survey was designed
to collect information to address each research question; Table 2
summarizes the data and their purpose. Questionnaires were
mostly quantitative, and respondents were artisanal fishermen
and tourism operators, including those involved in sport fishing.
These two stakeholder groups were selected because they spend
considerable time on the water, giving them a good idea of the
reality of each location. The questionnaires were conducted in
communities adjacent to MPAs. We selected questionnaire
respondents using snowball sampling, and convenience sampling
at beaches, fish landing sites, marinas, and tourism companies.
Key informant interviews were semistructured and were used to
validate the information received from the questionnaires. Key
informants included government staff  (Coast Guard,
INCOPESCA, and SINAC), managers of tour companies,
community leaders, leaders of fishing associations, and
researchers. Most key informants were contacted by telephone or
email to arrange meetings. All interviews were conducted in
person and in Spanish by AA, a Costa Rican.
Table 2. Individual and marine protected area (MPA) variables
used to explain compliance, with corresponding research question
(s) for each variable.
 
Level Research
 Variables Metric question
Individual level
Number of people who fish
illegally
Six-point scale 1-2
Frequency of illegal fishing Six-point scale 1-2
Seen someone fish illegally in
the MPA
Yes or no 1
Personally know someone who
knowingly fished illegally in the
MPA
Yes or no 1
Involvement in decision making Not involved, passively
involved, very involved
2
Support for MPA Rated from 0 to 100 2
Effectiveness of government
efforts against illegal fishing
Rated from 0 to 100 2
Fisherman or not Yes or no 2
MPA level
Size Km² 2
Type Take or no take 2
Tourism levels Number of hotel rooms in
districts adjacent to MPA†
2
†Caballo was not considered part of a district because it is located
approximately 8 kilometers from the coastline, and it is a small fishing
community with no tourism industry.
Noncompliance is a sensitive behavior; therefore compliance
studies are prone to response and nonresponse bias. Response
bias arises when people give inaccurate answers; nonresponse bias
occurs when people refuse to participate in surveys. We used
several techniques to reduce these biases (see Arias 2015 for a
review). First, when approaching potential interviewees, the
interviewer identified himself  as a student. Students can be
considered neutral parties when compared with, for instance,
government employees, and respondents can feel more
comfortable when talking about sensitive behaviors with a neutral
or impartial party (Roggenbuck 1992). Second, potential
interviewees were told clearly that the questionnaire was
anonymous. Anonymity reduces the “threat” of being accused of
noncompliance. Third, the questionnaire started with
nonsensitive questions and gradually increased their sensitivity.
This allowed respondents to become accustomed to the
interviewer and the interviewing process, rather than facing
potentially confronting questions at the outset. Fourth, we used
indirect questioning. Indirect questioning refers to the
compliance behavior of others and not to that of the respondent;
we therefore refer to it as “perceived compliance.” This technique
has been used for several decades and has been shown to reduce
bias (e.g., the bias arising from answering in a way that that will
be viewed favorably by the interviewer), allowing respondents to
mask their own attitudes and behaviors through impersonality
(Fisher 1993). Recent compliance studies in conservation contexts
indicate the utility of perceived compliance (Arias and Sutton
2013, Cross et al. 2013), coinciding with findings from fields such
as marketing (Jo et al. 1997). Additionally, studies have found
correlations between perceived compliance and ecological health
(Pollnac et al. 2010). Perceived compliance therefore appears to
be an adequate proxy for actual compliance. Actual compliance
can only be established by direct observation, making it infeasible
in most cases. In this study we measured perceived compliance
with fishery regulations in MPAs. By using these four techniques,
it is likely that we reduced response and nonresponse biases.
Compliance levels
Our first objective was to identify perceived compliance levels in
each MPA. We used a composite measure of perceived compliance
based on the number of illegal fishers and the frequency of illegal
fishing. Including frequency is key because it provides a measure
of illegal fishing effort (Arias 2015, Arias and Sutton 2013). For
instance, the impact that five fishers have on an MPA would be
very different if  they fished every day versus only once a month.
Preliminary analysis indicated that the number of illegal fishers
and the frequency of illegal fishing were positively correlated (rs
(93) = .47, p = 0); hence, in areas where the number of illegal
fishers was low, the frequency of illegal fishing also tended to be
low, and vice versa. Because both variables measure compliance
and they were moderately correlated, the values for each variable
were converted to z-scores and summed to create the composite
score for perceived compliance across interviewees for each MPA.
A z-score is a score’s relationship to the mean in a group of scores,
given in standard deviations. Hence, a z-score for an individual
MPA can be positive, negative, or zero, indicating whether it is
above, below, or equal to, respectively, the MPA population mean.
We elicited two additional metrics of perceived compliance by
asking participants two proxy questions: (1) if  they personally
knew somebody who had knowingly fished illegally in the MPA
and (2) if  they had seen someone fishing illegally in the MPA
within the last year. In Australia, Arias and Sutton (2013) found
that fishermen who personally knew someone who intentionally
fished illegally were more likely to have fished illegally themselves.
We performed Mann-Whitney tests to assess if  the compliance
levels perceived by those who replied yes were different from the
levels perceived by those who replied no to each of these two
questions.
Ecology and Society 20(4): 19
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss4/art19/
Factors influencing compliance
We used a linear mixed-effect model to quantify the influence on
perceived compliance of three MPA- and eight individual-level
predictor variables (Table 2 and Appendix 2). We used MPA as a
grouping variable (random effect) to account for potential
nonindependence of respondents within an MPA. Because there
is evidence suggesting that respondents project their own beliefs
and evaluations through indirect questioning (Fisher 1993), we
hypothesized that individual-level variables (e.g., support of
MPA, Table 2) can be related to the compliance levels perceived
by respondents. We did not hypothesize or find a theoretical basis
for examining interactions between predictor variables. Predictor
variables were standardized using z-scores; this allowed direct
evaluation, on the same scale, of their relative effects on perceived
compliance levels. The variables included in the model were
grouped into three categories: management, planning, and
livelihoods (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Relationship between marine protected area (MPA) and
individual variables and perceived levels of compliance. Circles
and triangles represent the estimated effect of each variable.
Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Positive estimates are
shown in green, negative are in red, and no effect is black.
Filled red circles indicate a clear negative relationship to
compliance; open green circles represent likely positive
relationships to compliance (≥80% of the confidence intervals
in a positive direction).
Tourism data were provided by the Costa Rican Tourism Institute
in 2015. Data analyses were performed using SPSS version 20
(IBM, Armonk, New York, USA; http://www.ibm.com/) and S-
PLUS version 8 (TIBCO Software, Palo Alto, California, USA;
http://www.tibco.com/). Normality of modeled residuals was
analyzed using Q-Q plots.
RESULTS
We collected a total of 99 questionnaires and 41 key informant
interviews (Appendix 3). The response rate was 95% for the
questionnaires and 100% for key informant interviews. All
questionnaire respondents were male, mostly between 30 and 49
years old. Among the respondents, 63 relied exclusively on fishing
(hereafter: fishermen), all of whom were associated with Pacific
MPAs; 13 relied exclusively on tourism; and 23 had multiple
livelihoods including fishing or tourism.
What were the levels of compliance in each MPA?
There was a high variability in perceived compliance levels
between MPAs (Fig. 2). Levels of perceived compliance in Palito-
Montero, Cahuita, and Gandoca-Manzanillo were above average
(Fig. 2). The absolute number of illegal fishers was low to very
low in Palito-Montero, Cahuita, and Gandoca-Manzanillo, and
medium in all MPAs except for Caballo, where it was high. Illegal
fishing occurred nearly every day in all MPAs except Palito-
Montero, Cahuita, and Gandoca-Manzanillo. Qualitative key
informant interviews did not diverge from the information
received from the quantitative questionnaires and helped as
validation.
Fig. 2. Mean perceived compliance level per marine protected
area (MPA). Numbers on the y-axis indicate mean z-scores per
MPA. Z-scores are standard deviations above or below the
MPA population mean indicated by zero on the y-axis and
representing the mean z-score across MPAs. Error bars indicate
standard errors of the mean for each MPA, or variation
between responses of interviewees for each MPA.
Sixteen percent of respondents said that they had not seen anyone
fishing illegally within their corresponding MPA during the last
year; 47% of these respondents were from Palito-Montero,
Cahuita, and Gandoca-Manzanillo. Eighty-four percent of
respondents mentioned that they had seen someone fishing
illegally within the MPA during the last year, and 85% personally
knew someone who intentionally fished illegally within the MPA.
The compliance levels perceived by those who reported seeing
someone fish illegally within the MPA during the last year were
significantly lower than the compliance levels perceived by those
who did not (mean = –0.2 and 1.3, respectively; U = 299.5, p =
0.002). The compliance levels perceived by those who reported
personally knowing someone who fished illegally within the MPA
were not significantly different from the compliance levels
perceived by those who did not (mean = –0.08 and 0.17,
respectively; U = 499.5, p = 0.44).
What was influencing compliance levels?
Key informants
The key informant interviews provided important insights into
perceived compliance with MPAs. Key informants mentioned
that poverty and the lack of livelihood alternatives were serious
problems causing some of the illegal fishing. They also reported
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a paucity of resources to patrol and adequately manage the MPAs.
For instance, only Santa Rosa had a functioning patrol system
operated by the park; the other areas either had no boats or the
boats were inoperable (e.g., damaged, lack of funds, no qualified
staff  to operate them). Key informants mentioned that the Coast
Guard had multiple duties and that illegal fishing was not a high
priority compared with search and rescue and combatting drug
trafficking. Lastly, there was a general belief  that artisanal
fishermen and government institutions interacted sparsely, and
that this lack of communication should be corrected.
Linear mixed-effects model
The linear mixed-effects model (Fig. 1) revealed two predictor
variables that had clear negative relationships with perceived
compliance: size of the MPA and being a fisher. Additionally, four
other variables indicated a likely positive relationship with
perceived compliance: (1) tourism levels, (2) effectiveness of
government efforts to combat illegal fishing, (3) MPAs that
allowed some fishing, and (4) strong involvement in decision
making. Support for MPAs and passive involvement in decision
making (e.g., attending meetings but not participating in them)
had no discernible relationship with perceived compliance. See
Appendix 4 for additional figures.
DISCUSSION
Illegal fishing is a problem for many MPAs globally (Mora et al.
2006, Pollnac et al. 2010), and we found it present, at varying levels,
in all of the MPAs that we assessed. Nearly all respondents had
seen illegal fishing occurring inside MPAs and personally knew
someone who intentionally fished illegally within an MPA. These
responses provide a measure of descriptive social norms, i.e., what
others do (Cialdini et al. 1991), suggesting that illegal fishing is
common. Only three MPAs, Palito-Montero, Cahuita, and
Gandoca-Manzanillo, had markedly high levels of perceived
compliance (Fig. 2). Illegal fishing is of concern not only because
of its likely negative environmental effects, but also because
noncompliance can have a domino effect. If  fishers believe that
others are fishing illegally and perhaps are catching more fish
(Appendix 2, Table A2.1), they are less likely to comply themselves,
so compliance levels would continually decline (Cialdini et al.
1991, Arias 2015). For example, a participant from Cabo Blanco
stated that most people used to respect the MPA, but government
enforcement stopped and some free riders started fishing illegally.
Illegal fishing then became so widespread that there was no
noticeable difference between fishing inside versus outside of this
small MPA.  
It is often assumed that MPA compliance is associated solely with
enforcement efforts. Enforcement is typically necessary, but not
sufficient, to ensure compliance (Arias 2015). We found that
government efforts against illegal fishing, normally considered as
enforcement, can have a positive effect on perceived compliance;
however, other variables were also related to perceived compliance
(Fig. 1). Levels of perceived compliance were related to a range
of socioeconomic and institutional conditions, some that are
reasonably easy to influence and others that are more difficult to
influence.  
The compliance drivers easiest to influence include those
associated with management, i.e., participation, support, and
enforcement. Conservation is mostly about managing people, and
approaches that are inclusive of stakeholders tend to be more
successful than those that exclude stakeholders (Jentoft 2000,
Schultz et al. 2011). A meta-analysis of 55 studies identified
participation as a critical factor influencing compliance with
protected areas (Andrade and Rhodes 2012). However, our results
suggest that only the higher levels of involvement with MPA
decisions were positively related to compliance. Simply
supporting an MPA, or being weakly involved in decisions, seems
insufficient to positively influence compliance (Fig. 1). In fact,
some studies mention that participation can have negative
outcomes, such as dilution of scientific input and “elite capture,”
a situation in which only some participate and displace others
(Schultz et al. 2011). We did not collect information to further
describe the participation processes and therefore cannot
determine if  some aspects of participation were eroding
compliance in our study sites. It has been suggested that elite
capture of participation applies in Golfo Dulce (Solis et al. 2012),
and this might negatively affect compliance. Management
interventions should be adaptive, aiming for high levels of
participation that foster positive outcomes such as empowerment,
legitimacy, and ultimately, increased compliance. Some of these
positive outcomes can also be stimulated earlier through an MPA’s
planning process.  
The compliance drivers associated with planning, such as size of
the MPA and whether or not fishing is allowed, can be easy to
plan for in advance, but can be difficult to change in existing
MPAs, particularly when these changes require adjustments to
laws that can take years to come into effect. Planning
considerations such as MPA size, spacing, and location can also
influence the achievement of ecological objectives (Green et al.
2014). However, there are critical trade-offs in planning between
achieving compliance and achieving ecological objectives. Our
results suggest that larger MPAs and those that were no-take had
lower levels of perceived compliance (Fig. 1). Ecological
considerations for planning MPAs commonly suggest that large,
no-take MPAs are preferable to smaller ones because they can,
for instance, encompass more habitats and highly mobile species,
and offer higher levels of protection (Edgar et al. 2014, Green et
al. 2014). However, larger MPAs can be harder to manage, and
excluding fishing from coastal MPAs in developing countries is
likely to create friction with fishing communities (Ban et al. 2011);
hence, compliance and resultant ecological health are likely to
weaken. Embedded in social-ecological systems in developing
countries, smaller MPAs that allow regulated fishing tend to be
more tractable. We believe that Costa Rica’s moves to include
permissive MPA management categories (e.g., responsible fishing
areas) and increase stakeholder participation were steps in the
right direction. However, further steps are required to
significantly strengthen conservation planning, marine
governance, and socioeconomic conditions in coastal areas.  
We found two compliance drivers related to livelihoods, which are
notoriously difficult to change in fishing communities (Hill et al.
2012, Cinner 2014). We found that relying solely on fishing had
a clear negative relationship with perceived compliance, and
increased levels of tourism had a likely positive relationship with
perceived fishers’ compliance (Fig. 1). We believe that tourism
levels can serve as a proxy for livelihood options, at least in this
study’s context. Costa Rica has a strong nature-based tourism
market; most tourists engage in ecotourism and nautical tourism,
such as beach going, snorkeling, diving, and sport fishing (ICT
2015). High levels of tourism can generate more direct and
indirect jobs. Protected areas are associated with reduced poverty
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in Costa Rica (Andam et al. 2010), mainly through tourism
(Ferraro and Hanauer 2014). Increased tourism can offer a wide
diversity of livelihood alternatives, presenting fishermen with
options for relying less on catch and hence, for some people,
potentially reducing the motivations to fish illegally. Nevertheless,
the economic activity around sites with high levels of tourism
could also act as an incentive for some fishermen to stay in the
fishery or fish more (Daw et al. 2012), e.g., to meet increased local
demand for seafood. Therefore, the causal mechanisms through
which tourism and associated livelihoods influence fishers’
compliance are unclear. Although fishers’ compliance with MPAs
could potentially improve through more livelihood alternatives,
we believe that this can be a challenging strategy that should be
approached cautiously, and with objectives other than
compliance with MPAs, e.g., poverty alleviation.  
We identified steps toward informing and directing interventions
to enhance conservation through increased compliance. At the
time of sampling, we assessed perceived compliance with fisheries
regulations in ~50% of Costa Rica’s coastal MPAs. However,
because our selection of MPAs was nonrandom, the ability to
draw inferences outside our sample is limited. We provided a novel
and improved way of measuring compliance: a compound
variable formed by the number of people fishing illegally and a
measure of their effort. Future studies could make further
advances in two ways. First, more needs to be known about the
mechanisms through which factors such as management,
planning, and livelihoods influence compliance. Such studies
would benefit from small geographical scales and large sample
sizes. Second, conducting in-depth research in high-compliance
sites would provide insights into key drivers of compliance. High
compliance is the target behavior; therefore, areas with markedly
high compliance (or “bright spots”) can provide useful
information on the factors that strengthen fishers’ compliance. In
the case of MPAs in Costa Rica, Cahuita, Gandoca-Manzanillo,
and Palito-Montero seem to be bright spots (Fig. 2).
CONCLUSION
We found considerable levels of illegal fishing in multiple Costa
Rican MPAs. However, there were sites with comparatively high
levels of perceived compliance. Our study builds on previous
research (Peterson and Stead 2011, Andrade and Rhodes 2012,
Karper and Lopes 2014), adding information on the links between
compliance, livelihoods, and participation in management of
MPAs. However, the mechanisms through which participation
and livelihoods affect compliance remain unclear, indicating an
important area for future research. Our results suggest that MPA
design can play an important role in fishers’ compliance (Ban et
al. 2011, Arias et al. 2014) and that enforcement is not a
requirement for high compliance. Nevertheless, enforcement can
help uphold compliance levels, especially in areas where there is
a high dependence on fishing (e.g., Palito-Montero).
Governments and conservation practitioners have a suite of tools
to increase compliance. We identified several of these tools, along
with some of the implications of using them. We emphasize,
however, that adequate compliance interventions must be tailored
to their particular contexts: There are no blanket solutions.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/7999
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Appendix 2. Additional methods, results and discussion 
 
 
METHODS 
 
MPAs were either long-established (24-35 years) or recent (less than 10 years). 
All recent MPAs allowed fishing (Table 1), so the effect of age group on compliance levels 
could only be tested in MPAs that allowed fishing, and preliminary analysis revealed no 
effect. Hence MPA age (Table 1) was excluded from the linear mixed-effect model. 
 
To obtain additional information on factors influencing compliance we asked 
participants what they thought was driving compliance and noncompliance, ranking these 
responses according to the number of mentions. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table A2.1 summarizes the salient factors that respondents thought influenced 
compliance (i.e., why fishermen follow MPA rules) and noncompliance (i.e., why fishermen 
break MPA rules). 
 
Table A2.1. Three highest-ranked factors considered by respondents to influence compliance 
and noncompliance. n= number of mentions by respondents. 
 
Rank Compliance Noncompliance 
1 Afraid of sanctions (n=57) 
Better/easier fishing in protected area 
(n=49) 
2 
Complying brings benefits (individual, 
communal, or environmental) (n=52) 
Financial hardship (n=23) 
3 Complying is the right thing to do (n=16) Unlikely to get sanctioned (n=21) 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The factors influencing compliance that were identified by respondents revealed that 
there is some degree of purposeful, voluntary compliance (Table A2.1). Voluntary 
compliance is preferable to coerced compliance because it can: 1) indicate that natural 
resource users are assertive about the benefits of regulating use of natural resources, 2) 
provide a buffer when costly enforcement is suspended, and 3) confirm effective governance 
and management (Arias, 2015). Some respondents believed that compliance involves 
environmental, personal, or communal benefits (Table A2.1). The fact that most respondents 
believed that fishing illegally in MPAs could be better or easier than fishing outside of them 
(Table A2.1), suggests that MPAs, despite varying amounts of illegal fishing, could contain 
higher fish biomass than the non-protected areas. Even though voluntary compliance is 
preferred, a degree of enforcement is typically necessary (Arias, 2015; Braithwaite & 
Braithwaite, 2001; Tyler, 2003) to maintain deterrence and compliance (Table A2.1). We 
therefore consider that if the deficit of enforcement efforts detected in most of these sites 
were to continue, or deteriorate further, fishers who might be complying voluntarily could 
defect in the face of flagrant noncompliance. This is supported by our results, which suggest 
, and discu sion.       
that effective government efforts to combat illegal fishing can relate positively to perceived 
compliance (Figure 1). Furthermore, patrol efforts (either formal or informal) tend to be more 
effective in smaller areas (Ban et al., 2011), and this might explain why perceived 
compliance was lower in larger MPAs (Figure 1).  
We were also interested in knowing what respondents thought was influencing 
noncompliance. Respondents cited poverty and better fishing in MPAs as the main reasons 
for noncompliance (Table A2.1). Coastal communities in Costa Rica are predominantly poor 
(Morales-Aguilar, 2013). Scarcity of food or income could induce some people to fish 
illegally in MPAs, mostly if they believe that there are more fish in them than outside (Table 
A2.1). It is worth noting that, in Cahuita and Gandoca-Manzanillo, both in the Caribbean, 
people do not rely entirely on fishing, and fishing in Costa Rica’s Caribbean is much less 
productive than the Pacific (FAO, 2011). This low dependence on fishing can help explain 
the higher compliance in these two Caribbean sites. In contrast, the communities adjacent to 
MPAs with low perceived compliance (e.g., Caballo, Golfo Dulce, and Santa Rosa) rely 
substantially on fishing (Marín-Cabrera, 2012; Solis et al., 2012). This is particularly true at 
the small island of Caballo, where fishing is the only livelihood. These facts support the 
results of our model, which shows that fishers perceive lower levels of compliance than non-
fishers (Figure 1). It is likely that compliance levels were negatively affected by a high 
dependence on declining fisheries, and a lack of livelihood options. Similar conclusions have 
been drawn by previous studies. Peterson and Stead (2011) suggested that the main causes for 
noncompliance with MPAs in Rodriguez, an island in the Western Indian Ocean, were lack of 
food and limited livelihood opportunities. Similarly, Karper and Lopes (2014) found that 
artisanal fishermen that depended more on fisheries had stronger intentions to break rules in a 
Brazilian MPA. Thus, declining or collapsed fisheries can give rise to illegal fishing and 
other types of noncompliance, and a high dependence on fisheries exacerbates the problem 
(Brashares et al., 2014; Gettleman, 2015).  
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Appendix 3. Number of questionnaires and key informant interviews per MPA. 
Marine Protected Area Questionnaires Key informant interviews Total 
Santa Rosa 5 9 14 
Ostional 11 4 15 
Camaronal-Caletas Arío 9 3 12 
Cabo Blanco 11 2 13 
Palito-Montero 11 2 13 
Caballo 8 1 9 
Manuel Antonio 9 5 14 
Marino Ballena 9 5 14 
Golfo Dulce 16 5 21 
Cahuita 7 3 10 
Gandoca-Manzanillo 3 2 5 
Total 99 41 140 
 
F 
Appendix 4. Bivariate relationships between compliance and involvement in MPA decisions (A), type of MPA (B), being a fisher or not (C), 
effectiveness of government efforts against illegal fishing (D), tourism levels (E), MPA size (F), and support towards MPA (G). Values on Y-axis of 
panels A-G and X-axis of panels D-G are z-scores (see Methods section). Note that these figures do not show the marginal relationship between variables 
shown in Figure 1 (model output). 
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